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Abstract—This paper studies two important signal processing
aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising
in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection
of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a rein-
forcement learning (adaptive filtering) algorithm that facilitates
learning an equilibrium by resorting to diffusion cooperation
strategies in a social network. Agents form homophilic social
groups, within which they exchange past experiences over an
undirected graph. It is shown that, if all agents follow the
proposed algorithm, their global behavior is attracted to the
correlated equilibria set of the game. The second part of the paper
provides a test to detect if the actions of agents are consistent
with play from the equilibrium of a concave potential game.
The theory of revealed preference from microeconomics is used
to construct a non-parametric decision test and statistical test
which only require the probe and associated actions of agents.
A stochastic gradient algorithm is given to optimize the probe
in real time to minimize the Type-II error probabilities of the
detection test subject to specified Type-I error probability. We
provide a real-world example using the energy market, and a
numerical example to detect malicious agents in an online social
network.
Index Terms—Multi-agent signal processing, non-cooperative
games, social networks, correlated equilibrium, diffusion co-
operation, homophily behavior, revealed preferences, Afriat’s
theorem, stochastic approximation algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
LEARNING, rationalizability, and equilibrium in gamesare of central importance in the analysis of social net-
works. Game theory has traditionally been used in economics
and social sciences with a focus on fully rational interac-
tions where strong assumptions are made on the information
patterns available to individual agents. In comparison, social
networks are comprised of agents with limited cognition and
communication capabilities, and it is the dynamic interactions
among agents that are of interest. This, together with the
interdependence of agents’ choices, motivates the need for
game-theoretic learning models for agents interacting in social
network.
The game-theoretic notion of equilibrium describes a con-
dition of global coordination where all agents are content
with their social welfare. Reaching an equilibrium, however,
involves a complex process of agents guessing what each other
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Equilibrium Behavior in Games
Reinforcement Learning
of Equilibrium
· Regret-matching
· Diffusion cooperation
· Correlated equilibrium
Detection of 
Equilibrium Play
· Revealed preferences
· Afriat’s theorem
· Nash equilibrium
Fig. 1. Two aspects of game-theoretic equilibrium behavior in social networks
discussed in this paper. Both aspects involve multi-agent signal processing
over a network. Stochastic approximation algorithms are used in both cases
to devise the desired scheme.
will do. Game-theoretic learning explains how such coordina-
tion might arise as a consequence of a long-run process of
learning from interactions and adapting behavior [1].
A. Main Ideas and Organization
The two aspects of equilibrium behavior in games that are
addressed in this paper along with the main tools used are
illustrated in Fig. 1. These two aspects are relevant to the broad
area of machine learning of equilibria in social networks. The
main results of this paper are summarized below:
1) Reinforcement learning dynamics in social networks:
The first part of this paper (Sec. II to Sec. IV) addresses
the questions: Can a social network of self-interested agents
that possess limited sensing and communication capabilities
reach a global equilibrium behavior in a distributed fashion?
If so, can formation of social groups that exhibit identical
homophilic characteristics facilitate the learning dynamics
within the network? The main idea is to propose a diffusion
based stochastic approximation algorithm (learning scheme)
that if each agent deploys, the collective behavior of the social
network converges to a correlated equilibrium.
Sec. II-A introduces non-cooperative games with ho-
mophilic social groups in a social network. Homophily1 refers
to a tendency of various types of individuals to exchange infor-
mation with others who are similar to themselves. The detec-
tion of social groups that show common behavioural character-
istics can be performed using such methods as matched sample
1In [2] the following illustrative example is provided for homophily
behavior in social networks: “If your friend jumped off a bridge, would you
jump too?” A possible reasons for answering “yes” is that you are friends as a
result of your fondness for jumping off bridges. Notice that this is different to
contagion behavior where “your friend inspired you to jump off the bridge”.
Due to space restrictions we do not consider contagion behavior in this paper.
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2estimation [3]. Sec. II-B introduces correlated equilibrium [4]
as the solution concept for such games. Correlated equilibrium
is a generalization of Nash equilibrium, however, is more
realistic in multi-agent learning scenarios since observation
of the past history of decisions (or their associated outcomes)
naturally correlates agents’ future decisions.
In Sec. III we present a regret-based reinforcement learning
algorithm that, resorting to diffusion cooperation strategies [5],
[6], implements cooperation among members of a social
group. The proposed algorithm is based on the well-known
regret-matching algorithm [7]–[9]. The proposed algorithm2
suits the emerging information patterns in social networks, and
allows to combine the past experiences of agents across the
network, which facilitates the learning dynamics and enables
agents to respond in real time to changes underlying the
network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that uses diffusion cooperation strategies to implement col-
laboration in game-theoretic reinforcement learning. Sec. IV
shows that if each agent individually follows the proposed
algorithm, the experienced regret will at most be  after
sufficient repeated plays of the game. Moreover, if all agents
follow the proposed algorithm independently, their collective
behavior across the network will converge to an -distance of
the polytope of correlated equilibria.
2) Detection of equilibrium play in a social networks: The
second part of the paper (Sec. V to Sec. VI) addresses the
question: Given datasets of the external influence and actions
of agents in a social network, is it possible to detect if the
behavior of agents is consistent with play from the equilibrium
of a concave potential game. The theory of revealed preference
from microeconomics is used to construct a non-parametric
decision test which only requires the time-series of data
D = {(pt, xt) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}} where pt ∈ Rm denotes
the external influence, and xt ∈ Rm denotes the action of
an agent. These questions are fundamentally different to the
model-based theme that is widely used in the signal processing
literature in which an objective function (typically convex)
is proposed and then algorithms are constructed to compute
the minimum. In contrast, the revealed preference approach
is data-centric—we wish to determine whether the dataset is
obtained from the interaction of utility maximizers.
Sec. V introduces how revealed preferences can be used to
detect if the actions of agents originated from play from a
concave potential game using only the external influence and
actions of the agents. Specifically in Sec. V-A we introduce the
preliminary tools of revealed preference for detecting utility
maximization of single agents. Sec. V-B provides a non-
parametric test to detect if the actions of agents is a result
of play from a concave potential game. If the actions are
measured in noise then Sec. V-C provides a non-parametric
statistical test for play from a concave potential game with
guaranteed Type-I error probability. To reduce the probability
of Type-II errors of the statistical test Sec. V-D provides a si-
multaneous perturbation stochastic gradient (SPSA) algorithm
to adjust the external influence in real-time. Two examples are
2Although we use the term “algorithm,” the learning procedure mimics
human behavior; it involves minimizing a moving average regret and random
experimentation.
provided to illustrate the application decision test, statistical
test, and SPSA algorithm developed in Sec. V-B to Sec. V-D.
Concave potential games are considered for the detection
test as the detection tests for D to satisfy a Nash equilibrium
are very weak [10]. In this paper the requirement of D to
be consistent with Nash equilibrium of a concave potential
game provides stronger restrictions when compared to only a
Nash equilibrium while still encompassing a large set of utility
functions.
An interesting aspect of both parts of this paper is the
ordinal nature of decision making. In the learning dynamics of
Sec. III, the actions taken are ordinal; in the data-set parsing of
Sec. V, the utility function obtained is ordinal. Humans make
ordinal decisions3 since humans tend to think in symbolic
ordinal terms.
B. Literature
Game theoretic models for social networks have been stud-
ied widely [11], [12]. For example, [13] formulate graphical
games model where each agent’s influence is restricted to its
immediate neighbors. The reader is referred to [14] for an
treatment of interactive sensing and decision making in social
networks from the signal processing perspective.
Reinforcement Learning Dynamics: Regret-matching [7]–
[9] is known to guarantee convergence to the set of correlated
equilibria [4] under no structural assumptions on the game
model. The correlated equilibrium arguably provides a natural
way to capture conformity to social norms [15]. It can be
interpreted as a mediator [16] instructing people to take actions
according to some commonly known probability distribution.
The regret-based adaptive procedure in [7] assumes a fully
connected network topology, whereas the regret-based rein-
forcement learning algorithm in [8] assumes a set of isolated
agents who neither know the game, nor share information of
their past decisions with others. In [17], a regret-matching
algorithm is developed when agents exchange information over
a non-degenerate network connectivity graph.
The cooperation strategies in adaptive networked systems
can be classified as: (i) incremental strategies [18], (ii) con-
sensus strategies [19], and (iii) diffusion strategies [5]. In
the first class of strategies, information is passed from one
agent to the next over a cyclic path until all agents are
visited. In contrast, in the latter two, cooperation is enforced
among multiple agents rather than between two adjacent
neighbors. Diffusion strategies are shown to outperform con-
sensus strategies in [20]; therefore, we concentrate on former
to implement cooperation among social agents in Sec. III. The
diffusion strategies have been used previously for distributed
estimation, distributed decision making, and distributed Pareto
optimization in adaptive networks [6].
Detection of Equilibrium Play: Humans can be viewed as
social sensors that interact over a social network to provide
information about their environment. Social sensors go beyond
3Humans typically convert numerical attributes to ordinal scales before
making decisions. For example, it does not matter if the cost of a meal at a
restaurant is $200 or $205; an individual would classify this cost as “high”.
Also credit rating agencies use ordinal symbols such as AAA, AA, A.
3physical sensors–for example, user preferences for a particular
movie are available on Rotten Tomatoes but are difficult to
measure via physical sensors. Social sensors present unique
challenges from a statistical estimation point of view. First,
social sensors interact with and influence other social sen-
sors. Second, due to privacy concerns and time-constraints,
social sensors typically do not reveal their personal preference
rankings between actions. In classical revealed preference
theory in the micro-economics literature Afriat’s theorem gives
a non-parametric finite sample test to decide if an agent’s
actions to an external influence are consistent with utility
maximization [21]. The revealed preference test for single
agents has been applied to measuring the welfare effect of
price discrimination, analyzing the relationship between prices
of broadband Internet access and time of use service, and
auctions for advertisement position placement on page search
results from Google [22].
For interacting agents in a social network (i.e. players in a
game), single agent tests are not suitable. Typically the study
of interacting agents in a game require parametric assumptions
on the form of the utility function of the agents. Deb [10]
was the first to propose a detection test for players engaged
in a concave potential game based on Varian’s and Afriat’s
work [21], [23]. Potential games were introduced by Monderer
and Shapley [24] and are used extensively in the literature to
study the strategic behaviour of utility maximization agents.
A classical example is the congestion game [25] in which the
utility of each agent depends on the amount of resource it
and other agents in the social network use. Recently the anal-
ysis of energy use scheduling and demand side management
schemes in the energy market was performed using potential
games [26].
II. LEARNING EQUILIBRIA IN NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
WITH HOMOPHILIC SOCIAL GROUPS
This section introduces a class of non-cooperative games
with homophilic social groups. Homophily refers to a tendency
of various types of individuals to associate with others who are
similar to themselves—see footnote 1. Agents in homophilic
relationships share common characteristics that motivates their
communication. We then proceed to present and elaborate on a
prominent solution concept in non-cooperative games, namely,
correlated equilibrium.
A. Non-Cooperative Game Model
The standard representation of a non-cooperative game,
known as normal form or strategic form game is comprised
of three elements:
1. Set of agents: K = {1, · · · ,K}. Essentially, an agent
models an entity that is entitled to making decisions. Agents
may be people, sensors, mobile devices, etc., and are indexed
by k ∈ K.
2. Set of actions: Ak = {1, · · · , Ak}, that denotes the
actions, also referred to as pure strategies, available to agent
k at each decision point. A generic action taken by agent k is
denoted by ak. The actions of agents may range from deciding
to establish or abolish links with other agents [27] to choosing
among different technologies [28].
A generic joint action profile of all agents is denoted by
a =
(
a1, · · · , aK) ∈ AK, where AK = A1 × · · · × AK ,
and × denotes the Cartesian product. Following the common
notation in game theory, one can rearrange a as
a =
(
ak,a−k
)
, where a−k =
(
a1, · · · , ak−1, ak+1, · · · , aK)
denotes the action profile of all agents excluding agent k.
3. Utility function: uk : AK → R is bounded, and deter-
mines the payoff to agent k as a function of the action profile
a taken by all agents. The interpretation of such a payoff is the
aggregated rewards and costs associated with the chosen action
as the outcome of the interaction. The payoff function can
be quite general: It could reflect reputation or privacy, using
the models in [29], [30], or benefits and costs associated with
maintaining links in a social network, using the models in [27],
[31]. It could also reflect benefits of consumption and the costs
of production, download, and upload in content production
and sharing over peer-to-peer networks [32], or the capacity
available to users in communication networks [33].
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to non-
cooperative games in social networks in which agents have
identical homophilic characteristics. These situations are mod-
eled by a symmetric non-cooperative game in the economics
literature, that is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.1: A normal-form non-cooperative game is
symmetric if agents have identical action spaces, i.e., Ak =
A = {1, . . . , A} for all k ∈ K, and for all k, l ∈ K:
uk
(
ak,a−k
)
= ul
(
al,a−l
)
, if ak = al, a−k = a−l. (1)
Intuitively speaking, in a symmetric game, the identities of
agents can be changed without transforming the payoffs asso-
ciated with decisions. Symmetric games have been used in
the literature to model interaction of buyers and sellers in
the global electronic market [34], clustering [35], cooperative
spectrum sensing [36], and network formation models with
costs for establishing links [37].
Agents can further subscribe to social groups within which
they share information about their past experiences. This is
referred to as neighborhood monitoring [17]. The communi-
cation among agents, hence, their level of “social knowledge,”
can be captured by a connectivity graph, defined as follows:
Definition 2.2: The connectivity graph is a simple4 graph
G = (E ,K), where agents form vertices of the graph, and
(k, l) ∈ E ⇔ Agents k and l exchange information.
The open and closed neighborhoods of each agent k are then,
respectively, defined by
N k := {l ∈ K; (k, l) ∈ E} , and N kc := N k ∪ {k} . (2)
Agents are, in fact, oblivious to the existence of other agents
except their immediate neighbors on the network topology,
4A simple graph is an unweighted, undirected graph containing no self
loops or multiple edges.
4nor are they aware of the dependence of the outcome of their
decisions on those of other agents outside their social group.
Besides exchanging past decisions with neighbors, agents
realize the stream of payoffs as the outcome of their choices.
At each time n = 1, 2, . . ., each agent k makes a decision akn,
and realizes her utility
ukn
(
akn
)
= uk
(
akn,a
−k
n
)
. (3)
Here, we assume that the agents are unaware of the exact
form of the utility functions. However, even if agent k knows
the utility function, computing utilities is impossible as she
observes some (but not all) elements of a−kn .
Remark 2.1: It is straightforward to generalize the game
model described above to social networks in which agents
form multiple homophilic groups within which each agent
forms a social group of its own. The algorithm that we
present next can be employed in such clustered networks
with no further modification. However, for simplicity of the
presentation, we continue to use the single homophilic group
in the rest of this paper.
B. Correlated Equilibrium
In the first part, we focus on correlated equilibrium, which
is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Correlated Equilibrium): Let pi denote a
joint distribution on the joint action space AK, i.e.,
pi (a) ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ AK, and ∑a∈AK pi (a) = 1.
The set of correlated -equilibria Q is the convex polytope:
[see (4), shown at the bottom the page], where pik(i,a−k)
denotes the probability that agent k picks action i and the
rest a−k. If  = 0, the convex polytope represents the set of
correlated equilibria, and is denoted by Q.
Several reasons motivate adopting the correlated equilibrium
in large-scale social networks. It is structurally and computa-
tionally simpler than the Nash equilibrium. The coordination
among agents in the correlated equilibrium can further lead
to potentially higher utilities than if agents take their actions
independently (as required by Nash equilibrium) [4]. Finally,
it is more realistic as the observation of the common history
of actions naturally correlates agents future decisions [8].
An intuitive interpretation of correlated equilibrium is “co-
ordination in decision-making.” Suppose a mediator is observ-
ing a repeated interactive decision making process among mul-
tiple selfish agents. The mediator, at each period, gives private
recommendations as what action to take to each agent. The
recommendations are correlated as the mediator draws them
from a joint probability distribution on the action profile of all
agents; however, each agent is only given recommendations
about her own decision. Each agent can freely interpret the
recommendations and decide if to follow. A correlated equi-
librium results if neither of agents wants to deviate from the
provided recommendation. That is, in correlated equilibrium,
agents’ decisions are coordinated as if there exists a global
coordinating device that all agents trust to follow.
III. REGRET-BASED COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING
This section presents the adaptive decision making algo-
rithm that combines the regret-based reinforcement learning
procedure [8], in the economics literature, with the diffusion
cooperation strategies [5], [6], which has recently attracted
much attention in the signal processing society.
A. Agents’ Beliefs
Time is discrete n = 1, 2, . . .. At each time n, the
agent makes a decision akn according to a decision strategy
pkn = (p
k
n(1), · · · , pkn(A)) which relies on the agent’s belief
matrix Rkn = [r
k
n(i, j)]. Each element r
k
n(i, j) records the
discounted time-averaged regrets—losses in utilities—had the
agent selected action j every time it played action i in the
past, and is updated via the recursive expression: [see (5)
at the bottom of the next page]. In (5), 0 < ε  1 is
a small parameter that represents the adaptation rate of the
strategy update procedure, and is required when agents face a
game where the parameters (e.g. utility functions) slowly jump
change over time [17]. Further, I(X) denotes the indicator
operator: I(X) = 1 if statement X is true, and 0 otherwise.
Note that the update mechanism in (5) relies only on the
realized utilities, defined in (3).
Positive rkn(i, j) implies the opportunity to gain by switch-
ing from action i to j in future. Therefore, the regret-matching
reinforcement learning procedure, that we present later in this
section, assigns positive probabilities to all actions j for which
rkn(i, j) > 0. In fact, the probabilities of switching to different
actions are proportional to their regrets relative to the current
action, hence the name ‘regret-matching’.
B. Diffusion Cooperation Strategy
Inspired by the idea of diffusion least mean squares over
adaptive networks [6], [38], we enforce cooperation among
neighboring agents via exchanging and fusing regret informa-
tion. Such diffusion of regret information is rewarding since
agents belong to the same homophilic group—see Defini-
tion 2.1. That is, all agents attempt to optimize the same
utility function, however, in the presence of interdependence
among their decisions. It has been shown in [6], [38] that
such cooperation strategies can lead to faster resolution of
uncertainties in decentralized inference and optimization prob-
lems over adaptive networks, and enable agents to respond
in real time to changes underlying such problem. In view of
these benefits, this paper studies, for the first time, application
of such diffusion cooperation strategies in the game-theoretic
reinforcement learning context in social networks.
At the end of each decision period n, agent k shares the
belief matrix Rkn with the neighbors N k on the network
Q =
{
pi :
∑
a−k pi
k
(
i,a−k
) [
uk
(
j,a−k
)− uk(i,a−k)] ≤ , ∀i, j ∈ Ak, k ∈ K} (4)
rkn+1(i, j) = r
k
n(i, j) + ε
[
pkn(i)
pkn(j)
ukn
(
akn
) · I (akn = j)− ukn (akn) · I (akn = i)− rkn(i, j)] (5)
5Information Exchange 
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Fig. 2. Regret-matching with diffusion cooperation.
connectivity graph G—see Definition 2.2. Agent k then fuses
the collected information via a linear combiner [5], [6]:
R
k
n :=
∑
l∈Gk wklR
l
n (6)
where w
kl
denotes the weight that agent k assigns to the
regrets experienced by agent l in her immediate neighborhood
on the network connectivity graph. These weights give rise to
a global weight matrix W = [w
kl
] in the network of agents.
In this paper, we assume:
W := IK + εC, (7)
where ε is the same as the step-size in (5), and
C ′ = C, C1K = 0K , and
|ckl| ≤ 1, ckl ≥ 0 for k 6= l, ckl > 0 iff (k, l) ∈ E . (8)
Here, IK denotes the K ×K identity matrix, (·)′ denotes the
transpose operator, 1K and 0K represent K × 1 vector of all
ones and zeros, respectively. Agent k then combines the fused
information with her own realized utility at the current period,
and updates the decision policy for the next period.
It is shown in [39] that, by properly rescaling the periods
at which observation of individual agents and fusion of neigh-
boring beliefs take place, the standard diffusion cooperation
strategy in [38] can be approximated by the diffusion strategy
with the weight matrix W in (7). This further allows using the
well-known ordinary differential equation (ODE) method [40],
[41] for the convergence analysis. In light of (6), the belief of
each agent is a function of both her own past experience and
those of neighboring agents. This enables them to respond in
real-time to the non-stationarities underlying the game.
C. Regret-Matching With Diffusion Cooperation
The proposed reinforcement learning algorithm is summa-
rized in the following protocol that mimics human’s learning
process:
Social Decision Protocol
Step 1: Individual k chooses action akn randomly from
a weight vector (probabilities) pkn. This weight vector is
an ordinal function5 of regret due to its previous actions.
5An ordinal function orders pairs of alternatives such that one is considered
to be worse than, equal to, or better than the other—see item c) in Sec. III-D
Algorithm 1 Regret-Matching With Diffusion Cooperation
Initialization: Set
µk > A
∣∣ukmax − ukmin∣∣ ,
where ukmax and u
k
min denote the upper and lower bounds on
the utility function, respectively. Set the step-size 0 < ε 1,
and initialize
pk
0
= (1/A) · 1A, Rk0 = 0.
Step 1: Choose Action Based on Past Regret.
akn ∼ pkn =
(
pkn(1), . . . , p
k
n(A)
)
,
where pkn(i) is given in (9), and |x|+ = max{0, x}.
Step 2: Update Individual Regret.
Rkn+1 = R
k
n + ε
[
F k
(
akn
)−Rkn] (10)
where F k
(
akn
)
= [fij(a
k
n)] is an A×A matrix with elements
fkij
(
akn
)
=
pkn(i)
pkn(j)
ukn
(
akn
) · I (akn = j)− ukn(akn) · I (akn = i) .
Step 3: Fuse Regrets with Members of Social Group.
R
k
n+1 =
∑
l∈Nkc wklR
l
n. (11)
Recursion. Set n← n+ 1, and go Step 1.
Step 2: The individual updates regrets based on its actions
and the associated outcomes as
∑n
τ=1(1− ε)n−τF (akτ ),
where F (·) is an ordinal function of the action. The
exponential discounting places more importance on recent
actions.
Step 3: The individual then shares and fuses its regrets
with other individuals in the social group.
Below we abstract the above social decision protocol into
Algorithm 1 so as to facilitate analysis of the global behavior;
see also Fig. 2 for a schematic illustration of Algorithm 1. The
first two steps implement the regret-matching reinforcement
learning procedure [7], whereas the last step implements the
diffusion protocol [6], [38].
D. Discussion and Intuition
Distinct properties of the local adaptation and learning
algorithm summarized in Algorithm 1 are as follows:
a) Decision strategy: The randomized strategy (9) is
simply a weighted average of two probability vectors: The
first term, with weight 1 − δ, is proportional to the positive
part of the regrets. Taking the minimum with 1/A guarantees
that pkn is a valid probability distribution, i.e.,
∑
i p
k
n(i) = 1.
The second term, with weight δ, is just a uniform distribution
over the action space [8], [17]. It forces every action to be
played with some minimal frequency (strictly speaking, with
probability δ/A). The exploration factor δ is essential to be
pkn(i) =
{
(1− δ) min
{
1
µk
∣∣rkn(akn−1, i)∣∣+, 1A}+ δA , i 6= akn−1
1−∑j 6=i pkn(j), i = akn−1 (9)
6able to estimate the contingent utilities using only the realized
utilities; it can, as well, be interpreted as exogenous statistical
“noise.” As will be discussed later, larger δ will lead to the
convergence of the global behavior to a larger -distance of
the correlated equilibria set.
b) Adaptive behavior: In (10), ε essentially introduces
an exponential forgetting of the experienced regrets in the
past, and facilitates adaptivity to the evolution of the non-
cooperative game model over time. As agents successively
take actions, the effect of the old experiences on their current
decisions vanishes. This enables tracking time variations on a
timescale that is as fast as the adaptation rate of Algorithm 1.
c) Ordinal choice of actions: The decision strategy is
an ordinal function of the experienced regrets. Actions are
ordered based on the regret values with the exception that
all actions with negative regret are considered to be equally
desirable—see footnote 3.
d) Inertia: The choice of µk guarantees that there is
always a positive probability of picking the same action as
the last period. Therefore, µk can be viewed as an “inertia”
parameter. It mimics humnas’ decision making process and
plays a significant role in breaking away from bad cycles. This
inertia is, in fact, the very factor that makes convergence to the
correlated equilibria set possible under (almost) no structural
assumptions on the underlying game [7].
e) Markov chain construction: The sequence
{
akn, R
k
n
}
is a Markov chain with state space A, and transition proba-
bility matrix
P
(
akn = i
∣∣akn−1 = j) = Pji(Rkn).
The above transition matrix is continuous, irreducible and
aperiodic for each Rkn. It is (conditionally) independent of
other agents’ action profile, which may be correlated. More
precisely, let hn = {aτ}nτ=1, where aτ = (akτ ,a−kτ ) denote
the history of decisions made by all agents up to time n. Then,
Pr
(
akn = i,a
−k
n = a | hn−1
)
= Pr
(
akn = i
∣∣ hn−1)P (a−kn = a | hn−1)
= Pakn−1i
(
Rkn
)
P
(
a−kn = a | hn−1
)
.
(12)
The sample path of this Markov chain {akn} is fed back into the
stochastic approximation algorithm that updates Rkn, which in
turn affects its transition matrix. This interpretation is useful in
Sec. A when deriving the limit dynamical system representing
the behavior of Algorithm 1.
IV. EMERGENCE OF RATIONAL GLOBAL BEHAVIOR
This section characterizes the global behavior emerging
from agents individually following Algorithm 1.
A. Global Behavior
The global behavior zn of the network at each time n is
defined as the discounted empirical frequency of joint action
profile of all agents up to period n. Formally,
zn = (1− ε)n−1ea1 + ε
∑
2≤τ≤k(1− ε)k−τeaτ , (13)
where eaτ is a unit vector on the space of all possible joint
action profiles AK with the element corresponding to the joint
play aτ being equal to one. The small parameter 0 < ε  1
is the same as the adaptation rate in (10). It introduces an
exponential forgetting of the past decision profiles to enable
adaptivity of the network behavior to the evolution of the
game model. That is, the effect of the old game model
on the decisions of agents vanishes as they repeatedly take
actions. Given zn, the average utility accrued by each agent
can be straightforwardly evaluated, hence the name global
behavior. It is more convenient to define zn via the stochastic
approximation recursion
zn = zn−1 + ε [ean − zn−1] . (14)
B. Asymptotic Local and Global Behavior
In what follows, we present the main theorem that reveals
both the local and global behavior emerging from each agent
individually following Algorithm 1 in a static game model.
The regret matrices Rkn, k ∈ K, and zn will be used as
indicatives of agent’s local and global experience, respectively.
We use stochastic averaging [41] in order to characterize the
asymptotic behavior of Algorithm 1. The basic idea is that, via
a ‘local’ analysis, the noise effects in the stochastic algorithm
is averaged out so that the asymptotic behavior is determined
by that of a ‘mean’ dynamical system. To this end, in lieu of
working with the discrete-time iterates directly, one works with
continuous-time interpolations of the iterates. Accordingly,
define the piecewise constant interpolated processes
Rk,ε(t) = Rkn, z
ε(t) = zn for t ∈ [nε, (n+ 1)ε). (15)
Further, with slight abuse of notation, denote by Rkn the
regret matrix rearranged as vectors of length (A)2—rather than
an A × A matrix—and let Rk,ε(·) represent the associated
interpolated vector processes; see (15). Let further ‖ ·‖ denote
the Euclidean norm, and R− represent the negative orthant in
the Euclidean space of appropriate dimension. The following
theorem characterizes the local and global behavior emergent
from following Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4.1: Let tε be any sequence of real numbers
satisfying tε → ∞ as ε → 0. For each , there exists an
upper bound δ̂() on the exploration parameter δ such that, if
every agent follows Algorithm 1 with 0 < δ < δ̂() in (9), as
ε→ 0, the following results hold:
(i) The regret vector Rk,ε(·+tε) converges in probability to
an -distance of the negative orthant. That is, for any β > 0,
lim
ε→0
P
(
dist
[
Rk,ε(·+ tε),R−
]−  > β) = 0 (16)
where dist[·, ·] denotes the usual distance function.
(ii) The global behavior vector zε(· + tε) converges in
probability to the correlated -equilibria set C in the sense
that
dist
[
zε(·+ tε), C
]
= inf
z∈C
‖zε(·+ tε)− z‖ → 0. (17)
Proof: See Appendix A for a sketch of the proof.
The above theorem simply asserts that, if an agent in-
dividually follows Algorithm 1, she will experience regret
7TABLE I
AGENTS’ PAYOFFS IN A SYMMETRIC NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
a1 = 1 (2, 2, 5) (3, 6, 4)
a1 = 2 (6, 3, 4) (4, 4, 6)
a2 = 1 a2 = 2
(1, 1, 3) (1, 4, 5)
(4, 1, 0) (6, 6, 4)
a3 = 1 a3 = 2
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Fig. 3. Distance to correlated equilibrium vs. iteration number.
of at most  after sufficient repeated plays of the game.
Indeed,  can be made arbitrarily small by properly choosing
the exploration parameter δ in (9). It further states that, if
now all agents in the networked multi-agent system start
following Algorithm 1 independently, their collective behavior
converges to the correlated -equilibria set. Differently put,
agents can coordinate their strategies in a distributed fashion
so that the distribution of their joint behavior is close to the
correlated equilibria polytope. From the game-theoretic point
of view, it shows that non-fully rational local behavior of
agents—due to utilizing a ‘better-response’ rather than a ‘best-
response’ strategy—can lead to the manifestation of globally
sophisticated and rational behavior at the network level. Note
in the above theorem that the convergence arguments are to a
set rather than a particular point in that set.
Remark 4.1: The constant step-size in Algorithm 1 enables
it to adapt to changes underlying the game model. Using
weak convergence methods [41], it can be shown that the
first result in Theorem 4.1 holds if the parameters underlying
the game undergo random changes on a timescale that is no
faster than the timescale determined by the adaptation rate of
Algorithm 1. The second result in Theorem 4.1 will further
hold if the changes occur on a slower timescale. The reader
is referred to [17] for further details.
C. Numerical Example
The limiting behavior of Algorithm 1 follows a differential
inclusion—see the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Appendix A.
Differential inclusions are generalizations of ordinary differ-
ential equations (ODEs) in which the sample paths belongs
to a set; therefore, independent runs lead to different sample
paths. This prohibits deriving an analytical rate of convergence
for reinforcement learning algorithms of this type. Here, we
resort to Monte Carlo simulations to illustrate and compare
the performance of Algorithm 1.
Consider a non-cooperative game among three agents K =
{1, 2, 3} with action set A = {1, 2}. Agents 1 and 2 exhibit
identical homophilic characteristics and, hence, form a social
group. That is, E = {(1, 2), (2, 1)} in the network connectivity
graph G—see Definition 2.2. In contrast, agent 3 is isolated
from agents 1 and 2 and, in fact, unaware of their existence.
Table I presents agents’ utilities in normal form: Each element
(x, y, z) in the table represents the utility of agents 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, corresponding to the particular choice of action.
Note in Table I that the game is symmetric between agents
1 and 2. Such situations arise in social networks when a
homophilic group of agents aims to coordinate their decisions
in response to the actions of other (homophilic groups of)
agents. Further, we set
C =
[−0.25 0.25
0.25 −0.25
]
in the weight matrix W , defined in (7). That is, agents 1
and 2 place 1/4 weight on the information they receive from
their neighbor on the connectivity graph, and 3/4 on their own
beliefs. We further set the exploration factor δ = 0.15 in the
decision strategy (9), and the step-size ε = 0.01 in (10).
As the benchmark, we use the standard reinforcement learn-
ing procedure [8] to evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1.
However, we replace its decreasing step-size with the constant
step-size ε so as to make the two algorithms both adaptive
and comparable. In view of the last step in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 in Appendix A, the distance to the polytope
of correlated equilibrium can be evaluated by the distance of
the agents’ regrets to the negative orthant. More precisely, we
quantify the distance to correlated equilibrium set by
dn = max
k∈K
√∑
i,j
(|rkn(i, j)|+)2. (18)
Fig. 3 shows how dn diminishes with time n for both
algorithms. Each point of the depicted sample paths is an
average over 100 independent runs of the algorithms. As is
clearly evident, cooperation with neighboring agents over the
network topology improves the rate of convergence to the
correlated equilibrium. Algorithm 1 outperforms the reinforce-
ment learning procedure [8] particularly in the initial stages of
the learning process, where sharing experiences (regrets) with
neighbors leads to dn monotonically decreasing with n.
V. DETECTION OF EQUILIBRIUM PLAY IN GAMES
We now move on to the second part of the paper, namely, us-
ing the principle of revealed preferences to detect equilibrium
play of agents in a social network. The setup is depicted in Fig.
4. The main questions addressed are: Is it possible to detect if
the agents are utility maximizers? If yes, can the behavior of
the agents be learned using the data from the social network?
As mentioned in Sec. I, these questions are fundamentally
different to the model-based theme that is widely used in the
signal processing literature in which an objective function (typ-
ically convex) is proposed and then algorithms are constructed
to compute the minimum. In contrast, the revealed preference
approach is data-centric–we wish to determine whether the
dataset is obtained from the interaction of utility maximizers.
8Classical revealed preference theory seeks to determine if an
agent is an utility maximizer subject to a budget constraint
based on observing its actions over time and is widely studied
in the micro-economics literature. The reader is referred to the
works [22] by Varian (chief economist at Google) for details.
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Fig. 4. Schematic of a social network containing n interacting agents where
pt ∈ Rm denotes the external influence, and xit ∈ Rm the action of agent
i in response to the external influence and other agents at time t. Note that
dotted line denotes consumers 4, . . . , n − 1. The aim is to determine if the
dataset D = {(pt, x1t , x2t , . . . , xnt ) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}} is consistent with
play from a Nash equilibrium of players engaged in a concave potential game.
A. Preliminaries: Utility Maximization and Afriat’s Theorem
Deterministic revealed preference tests for utility maximiza-
tion were pioneered by Afriat [21], and further developed by
Diewert [42], and Varian [23]. Given a time-series of data
D = {(pt, xt), t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}} where pt ∈ Rm denotes the
external influence, xt denotes the action of an agent, and t
denotes the time index, is it possible to detect if the agent is
an utility maximizer? An agent is an utility maximizer at each
time t if for every external influence pt, the selected action xt
satisfies
xt(pt) ∈ arg max
{p′tx≤It}
u(x) (19)
with u(x) a non-satiated utility function. Non-satiated means
that an increase in any element of action x results in the
utility function increasing. The non-satiated assumption rules
out trivial cases such as a constant utility function which can
be optimized by any action, and as shown by Diewert [42],
without local non-satiation the maximization problem (19)
may have no solution. In (19) the social budget constraint
p′txt ≤ It denotes the total amount of resources available to
the social sensor for selecting the action xt in response to
the external influence pt. An example is the aggregate power
consumption of agents in the energy market. The external
influence is the cost of using a particular resource, and the
action is the amount of resources used. The social impact
budget is therefore the total cost of using the resources and
is given by p′txt = It. Further insight into the social impact
budget constraint is provided in Sec. VI.
The celebrated “Afriat’s theorem” provides necessary and
sufficient conditions for a finite dataset D to have originated
from an utility maximizer.
Theorem 5.1 (Afriat’s Theorem): Given a dataset D =
{(pt, xt) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}}, the following statements are
equivalent:
1) The agent is a utility maximizer and there exists a non-
satiated and concave utility function that satisfies (19).
2) For scalars ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities
has a feasible solution:
uτ − ut − λtp′t(xτ − xt) ≤ 0 for t, τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
(20)
3) A non-satiated and concave utility function that satisfies
(19) is given by:
u(x) = min
t∈T
{ut + λtp′t(x− xt)} (21)
4) The dataset D satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference (GARP), namely for any k ≤ T ,
p′txt ≥ p′txt+1 ∀t ≤ k − 1 =⇒ p′kxk ≤ p′kx1. 
As pointed out in [23], a remarkable feature of Afriat’s
theorem is that if the dataset can be rationalized by a non-
trivial utility function, then it can be rationalized by a contin-
uous, concave, monotonic utility function. “Put another way,
violations of continuity, concavity, or monotonicity cannot be
detected with only a finite number of demand observations”.
Verifying GARP (statement 4 of Theorem 5.1) on a dataset
D comprising T points can be done using Warshall’s algorithm
with O(T 3) [23] computations. Alternatively, determining if
Afriat’s inequalities (20) are feasible can be done via a LP
feasibility test (using for example interior point methods [43]).
Note that the utility (21) is not unique and is ordinal by
construction. Ordinal means that any monotone increasing
transformation of the utility function will also satisfy Afriat’s
theorem. Therefore the utility mimics the ordinal behavior of
humans. Geometrically the estimated utility (21) is the lower
envelop of a finite number of hyperplanes that is consistent
with the dataset D.
B. Decision Test for Nash Rationality
We now consider a version of Afriat’s theorem for deciding
if a dataset D from a social network is generated by agents
playing from the equilibrium of a potential game. Potential
games have been used in telecommunication networking for
tasks such as routing, congestion control, power control in
wireless networks, and peer-to-peer file sharing [44], and
in social networks to study the diffusion of technologies,
advertisements, and influence [45].
Consider the social network of interconnected agents in
Fig. 4, given a time-series of data from n agents D =
{(pt, x1t , . . . , xnt ) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}} with pt ∈ Rm the
external influence, xit the action of agent i, and t the time
index, is it possible to detect if the dataset originated from
agents that play a potential game? In Fig. 4 the actions of
agents are dependent on both the external influence pt and the
actions of the other agents in the social network. The utility
function of the agent now includes the actions of other agents–
formally if there are n agents, each has a utility function
ui(xi, x−it ) with x
i denoting the action of agent i, x−it the
actions of the other n − 1 agents, and ui(·) the utility of
agent i. Given a dataset D, is it possible to detect if the
data is consistent with agents playing a game and maximizing
their individual utilities? Deb, following Varian’s and Afriat’s
9work, shows that refutable restrictions exist for the dataset D,
given by (22), to satisfy Nash equilibrium (23) [10]. These
refutable restrictions are however, satisfied by most D [10].
The detection of agents engaged in a concave potential game,
and generating actions that satisfy Nash equilibrium, provide
stronger restrictions on the dataset D [10]. We denote this
behaviour as Nash rationality, defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 ( [10]): Given a dataset
D = {(pt, x1t , x2t , . . . , xnt ) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}}, (22)
D is consistent with Nash equilibrium play if there exist utility
functions ui(xi, x−i) such that
xit = x
i∗
t (pt) ∈ arg max
{p′txi≤Iit}
ui(xi, x−i). (23)
In (23), ui(x, x−i) is a non-satiated utility function in x,
x−i = {xj}j 6=i for i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and the elements
of pt are strictly positive. Non-satiated means that for any
 > 0, there exists a xi with ‖xi − xit‖2 <  such that
ui(xi, x−i) > ui(xit, x
−i
t ). If for all x
i, xj ∈ Xi, there exists
a concave potential function V that satisfies
ui(xi, x−i)− ui(xj , x−i) > 0
iff V (xi, x−i)− V (xj , x−i) > 0 (24)
for all the utility functions ui(·) with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then
the dataset D satisfies Nash rationality. 
Just as with the utility maximization budget constraint in (19),
the budget constraint p′tx
i ≤ Iit in (23) models the total
amount of resources available to the agent for selecting the
action xit to the external influence pt.
The following theorem provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for a dataset D (22) to be consistent with Nash
rationality (Definition 5.1). The proof is analogous to Afriat’s
Theorem when the concave potential function of the game is
differentiable [10], [46].
Theorem 5.2 (Multi-agent Afriat’s Theorem): Given a
dataset D (22), the following statements are equivalent:
1) D is consistent with Nash rationality (Definition 5.1) for
an n-player concave potential game.
2) Given scalars vt and λit > 0 the following set of
inequalities have a feasible solution for t, τ ∈ {1, . . . , T},
vτ − vt −
n∑
i=1
λitp
′
t(x
i
τ − xit) ≤ 0. (25)
3) A concave potential function that satisfies (23) is given
by:
Vˆ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = min
t∈T
{vt+
n∑
i=1
λitp
′
t(x
i−xit)}. (26)
4) The dataset D satisfies the Potential Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preference (PGARP) if the following two
conditions are satisfied.
a) For every dataset Diτ = {(pt, xit) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all τ ∈ {1, . . . , T}, Diτ
satisfies GARP.
b) The actions xit originated from agents in a concave
potential game. 
Note that if only a single agent (i.e. n = 1) is considered,
then Theorem 5.2 is identical to Afriat’s Theorem. Similar
to Afriat’s Theorem, the constructed concave potential func-
tion (26) is ordinal–that is, unique up to positive monotone
transformations. Therefore several possible options for Vˆ (·)
exist that would produce identical preference relations to the
actual potential function V (·). In 4) of Theorem 5.2, the first
condition only provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for the dataset D to be consistent with a Nash equilibrium
of a game, therefore the second condition is required to
ensure consistency with the other statements in the Multi-agent
Afriat’s Theorem. The intuition that connects statements 1 and
3 in Theorem 5.2 is provided by the following result from [24];
for any smooth potential game that admits a concave potential
function V , a sequence of responses {xi}i∈{1,2,...,n} are
generated by a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
it is a maximizer of the potential function,
xt = {x1t , x2t , . . . , xnt } ∈ arg maxV ({xi}i∈{1,2,...,n})
s.t. p′tx
i ≤ Iit ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} (27)
for each probe vector pt ∈ Rm+ .
The non-parametric test for Nash rationality involves deter-
mining if (25) has a feasible solution. Computing parameters
vt and λit > 0 in (25) involves solving a linear program
with T 2 linear constraints in (n + 1)T variables, which has
polynomial time complexity [43]. In the special case of one
agent, the constraint set in (25) is the dual of the shortest path
problem in network flows. The parameters ut and λt in (20)
can be computed using Warshall’s algorithm with O(T 3) [23].
C. Statistical Test for Nash Rationality
In real world analysis a dataset may fail the Nash rationality
test (25) as a result of the agents actions xt being measured
in noise. In this section a statistical test is provided to detect
for Nash rationality when the actions are measured in noise.
Here we consider additive noise wt such that the measured
dataset is given by:
Dobs = {(pt, y1t , y2t , . . . , ynt ) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}}, (28)
consisting of external influences pt and noisy observations of
the agents actions yit = x
i
t + w
i
t. In such cases a feasibility
test is required to test if the clean dataset D satisfies Nash
rationality (25). Let H0 and H1 denote the null hypothesis
that the clean dataset D satisfies Nash rationality, and the
alternative hypothesis that D does not satisfy Nash rationality.
In devising a statistical test for H0 vs H1, there are two
possible sources of error:
Type-I errors: Reject H0 when H0 is valid.
Type-II errors: Accept H0 when H0 is invalid. (29)
Given the noisy dataset Dobs (28) the following statistical
test can be used to detect if a group of agents select actions
that satisfy Nash equilibrium (23) when playing a concave
potential game:
+∞∫
Φ∗{y}
fM (ψ)dψ
H0
≷
H1
γ . (30)
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In the statistical test (30):
(i) γ is the “significance level” of the statistical test.
(ii) The “test statistic” Φ∗{y} is the solution of the following
constrained optimization problem for
y = {(y1t , y2t , . . . , ynt )}t∈{1,2,...,T}:
min Φ
s.t. vτ − vt −
n∑
i=1
λitp
′
t(y
i
τ − yit)−
n∑
i=1
λitΦ ≤ 0
λit > 0 Φ ≥ 0 for t, τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
(31)
(iii) fM is the probability density function of the random
variable M where
M ≡ Max
t,τ
[∑n
i=1 |p′t(wit − wiτ )|
]
. (32)
The following theorem characterizes the performance of the
statistical test (30). The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 5.3: Consider the noisy dataset Dobs (28) of exter-
nal influences and actions. The probability that the statistical
test (30) yields a Type-I error (rejects H0 when it is true) is
less then γ. (Recall H0 and H1 are defined in (29)). 
Note that (31) is non-convex due to
∑
λitΦ; however, since
the objective function is given by the scalar Φ, for any fixed
value of Φ, (31) becomes a set of linear inequalities allowing
feasibility to be straightforwardly determined [47].
D. Stochastic Gradient Algorithm to Minimize Type-II Errors
Theorem 5.3 above guarantees the probability of Type-
I errors is less then γ for the statistical test (30) for the
detection of Nash rationality (Definition 5.1) from a noisy
dataset Dobs (28). In this section, the statistical test (30)
is enhanced by adaptively optimizing the external influence
vectors p = [p1, p2, . . . , pT ] to reduce Type-II errors.
Reducing the Type-II error probability can be achieved
by dynamically optimizing the external influence p =
[p1, . . . , pT ]. The external influence p is selected as the
solution of
p∗ ∈ arg min
p∈Rm×T+
J(p)
= P
( +∞∫
Φ∗(y)
fM (β)dβ > α
∣∣{p,x(p)} ∈ A)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Type-II error
. (33)
In (33), y = x(p) +w with y defined above (31), fM is the
probability density function of the random variable M (32),
P(· · · |·) denotes the conditional probability that (30) accepts
H0 for all agents given that H0 is false. The set A contains all
elements {p,x(p)}, with x(p) = [xit(pt), . . . , xnt (pt)], where
{p,x(p)} does not satisfy Nash rationality (Definition 5.1).
To compute (33) requires a stochastic optimization algo-
rithm as the probability density functions fM are not known
explicitly. Given that we must estimate the gradient of the
objective function in (33), and that p ∈ Rm×T+ can comprise
a large dimensional matrix, the simultaneous perturbation
stochastic gradient (SPSA) algorithm is utilized to estimate p
from (33) [48]. The SPSA allows the gradient to be estimated
using only two measurements of the objective function cor-
rupted by noise, and for decreasing step size the algorithm with
probability one reaches a local stationary point. The SPSA
algorithm used to compute p is provided below.
Step 1:Choose initial probe po = [p1, p2, . . . , pT ] ∈ Rm×T+
Step 2:For iterations q = 1, 2, 3, . . .
· Estimate the cost (i.e. probability of Type-II errors)
in (33) using
Jˆq(pq) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
I
(
FM (Φ
∗(yk)) ≤ 1− α
)
(34)
where I denotes the indicator function, and FM (·) is
an estimate of the cumulative distribution function
of M constructing by generating random samples
according to (32). In (34) Φ∗(yk) is computing using
(31) with the noisy observations yk = x(pq) +wk.
Note that wk is a fixed realization of w, and the
dataset {pq,x(pq)} ∈ A defined below (33). The
parameter K in (34) controls the accuracy of the
empirical probability of Type-II errors (33).
· Compute the gradient estimate ∇ˆpJˆq(pq):
∇ˆpJˆq(pq) = Jˆq(pq + ∆qσ)− Jˆq(pq −∆qσ)
2σ∆q
(35)
∆q(i) =
{
−1 with probability 0.5
+1 with probability 0.5
with gradient step size σ > 0.
· Update the probe vector pk with step size  > 0:
pq+1 = pq − ∇ˆpJˆq(pq).
The benefit of using the SPSA algorithm is that the estimated
gradient ∇pJq(pq) in (35) can be computed using only two
measurements of the function (34) per iteration; see [48] for
the convergence and tutorial exposition of the SPSA algorithm.
In particular, for constant step size , it converges weakly (in
probability) to a local stationary point [47].
VI. EXAMPLES OF EQUILIBRIUM PLAY: ENERGY MARKET
AND DETECTION MALICIOUS AGENTS
In this section we provide two examples of how the decision
test (25), statistical detection test (30), and stochastic opti-
mization algorithm (35) from Sec. V can be applied to detect
for Nash rationality (Definition 5.1) in a social network. The
first example uses real-world aggregate power consumption
data from the Ontario energy market social network. The
second is the detection of malicious agents in an online social
network comprised of normal agents, malicious agents, and an
authentication agent.
A. Nash Rationality in Ontario Electrical Energy Market
In this section we consider the aggregate power consump-
tion of different zones in the Ontario power grid. A sampling
period of T = 79 days starting from January 2014 is used to
generate the dataset D for the analysis. All price and power
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consumption data is available from the Independent Electricity
System Operator6 (IESO) website. Each zone is considered
as an agent in the corporate network illustrated in Fig. 5.
The study of corporate social networks was pioneered by
Granovetter [49] which shows that the social structure of the
network can have important economic outcomes. Examples
include agents choice of alliance partners, assumption of ra-
tional behavior, self interest behavior, and the learning of other
agents behavior. Here we test for rational behavior (i.e. utility
maximization and Nash rationality), and if true then learn the
associated behavior of the zones. This analysis provides useful
information for constructing demand side management (DSM)
strategies for controlling power consumption in the electricity
market.
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Fig. 5. Schematic of the electrical distribution network in the Ontario power
grid. The nodes 1, 2, . . . , 10 correspond to the distribution zones: Northwest,
Northeast, Bruce, Southwest, Essa, Ottawa, West, Niagara, Toronto, and East.
The dotted circles indicate zones with external interconnections–these nodes
can import/export power to the external network which includes Manitoba,
Quebec, Michigan, and New York. The network can be considered a corporate
social network of chief financial officers.
The zones power consumption is regulated by the associated
price of electricity set by the senior management officer in
each respective zone. Since there is a finite amount of power
in the grid, each officer must communicate with other officers
in the network to set the price of electricity. Here we utilize
the aggregate power consumption from each of the n = 10
zones in the Ontario power grid and apply the non-parametric
tests for utility maximization (20) and Nash rationality (25)
to detect if the zones are demand responsive. If the utility
maximization or Nash rationality tests are satisfied, then the
power consumption behaviour is modelled by constructing the
associated utility function (21) or concave potential function
of the game (26).
To perform the analysis the external influence pt and action
of agents xt must be defined. In the Ontario power grid
the wholesale price of electricity is dependent on several
factors such as consumer behaviour, weather, and economic
conditions. Therefore the external influence is defined as
pt = [pt(1), pt(2)] with pt(1) the average electricity price
between midnight and noon, and pt(2) as the average between
noon and midnight with t denoting day. The action of each
zone correspond to the total aggregate power consumption in
each respective tie associated with pt(1) and pt(2) and is given
by xit = [x
i
t(1), x
i
t(2)] with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The budget Iit
of each zone has units of dollars as pt has units of $/kWh and
xit units of kWh.
We found that the aggregate consumption data of each zone
does not satisfy utility maximization (20). Is this a result
6http://ieso-public.sharepoint.com/
of measurement noise? Assuming the power consumption of
agents are independent and identically distributed, the central
limit theorem suggests that the aggregate consumption of
regions follows a zero mean normal distribution with variance
σ2. The noise term w in (32) is given by the normal distri-
bution N (0, σ2). Therefore, to test if the failure is a result of
noise, the statistical test (30) is applied for each region, and
the noise level σ2 estimated for the dataset Dobs to satisfy
the γ = 95% confidence interval for utility maximization.
The results are provided in Fig. 6. As seen from Fig. 6, the
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Fig. 6. Average consumption (gray) and associated noise level σ (black)
for the price and demand data to satisfy utility maximization in each of the
1,. . . ,10 zones in the Ontario power grid defined in Fig. 5. The average hourly
consumption over the T = 79 days starting from January 2014.
Essa, West, Toronto, and East zones do not satisfy the utility
maximization requirement. This results as the required noise
level σ for the stochastic utility maximization test to pass is too
high compared with the average power consumption. There-
fore if each zone is independently maximizing then only 60%
of the Ontario power grid satisfies the utility maximization test.
However it is likely that the zones are engaged in a concave
potential game–this would not be a surprising result as network
congestion games have been shown to reduce peak power
demand in distributed demand management schemes [50].
To test if the dataset D is consistent with Nash rationality
the detection test (25) is applied. The dataset for the power
consumption in the Ontario power gird is consistent with
Nash rationality. Using (25) and (26), a concave potential
function for the game is constructed. Using the constructed
potential function, when do agents prefer to consume power?
The marginal rate of substitution7 (MRS) can be used to
determine the preferred time for power usage. Formally, the
MRS of xi(1) for xi(2) is given by
MRS12 =
∂Vˆ /∂xi(1)
∂Vˆ /∂xi(2)
.
From the constructed potential function we find that MRS12 >
1 suggesting that the agents prefer to use power in the time
period associated with xt(1)–that is, the agents are willing to
give up MRS12 kWh of power in the time period associated
with xi(2) for 1 additional kWh of power in time period
associated with xi(1).
The analysis in this section suggests that the power con-
sumption behavior of agents is consistent with players engaged
in a concave potential game. Using the Multi-agent Afriat’s
Theorem the agents preference for using power was estimated.
7The amount of one good that an agent is willing to give up in exchange
for another good while maintaining the same level of utility.
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This information can be used to improve the DSM strategies
to control power consumption in the electricity market.
B. Detecting Malicious Agents in Online Social Networks
Socialbots and spambots are autonomous programs which
attempt to imitate human behavior and are prevalent on pop-
ular social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. In
this section we consider the detection of malicious agents in an
online social network comprised of normal agents, malicious
agents, and a network authentication agent as depicted in Fig.
7.
Online Social Network
pt
xitAuthentication
Agent Fictitious
Network
Fig. 7. Schematic of an online social network with a network authentication
agent that is able to create a fictitious agents (black) to interact with real
agents in the social network. Two types of agents are considered: normal
agents (white), and malicious agents (grey). The goal is for the authentication
agent to be able to detect and eliminate malicious agents from the online
social network. The parameters pt and actions xit are defined in Sec. VI-B.
Recent techniques for detecting malicious agents in the
social network (i.e. socialbots and spambots) use a method
known as behavioural blacklisting which attempts to detect
emails, tweets, friend and follower requests, and URLs which
have originated from malicious agents [51]. Behavioural black-
listing works as socialbots and spambots tend to have different
behaviors then humans. For example in Twitter, socialbots and
spambots tend to re-tweet far more then normal (i.e. human)
agents, and by contrast normal accounts tend to receive more
replies, mentions, and re-tweets [52]. The goal of malicious
agents is to increase their connectivity in the social network
to deliver harmful content such as viruses, gaining followers
and friends, marketing, and political campaigning. Consider
the network topology depicted in Fig. 7. The authentication
agent is designed to detect and eliminate malicious agents
in the network. To this end the authentication agent is able
to construct fictitious accounts to study the actions of other
agents in the network. Denoting pt ∈ Rm+ as queries for
authentication for the m fictitious accounts produced by the
authentication node at time t, the response of agent i is given
by xit ∈ Rm+ and is the total number of successfully targeted
followers and friends of each of the m fictitious accounts.
Note that larger values of pt indicate a stronger quarry for
authentication. We consider the following utility function for
malicious agents:
ri(xi, x−i) = ln
[
xi(1)xi(2)∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 x
i(1)xj(2)
]
si(xi;β) = ln
[∏l
j=1
(
1 + x
i(j)
β(j)
)]
ui(xi, x−i) = ri(xi, x−i) + si(xi;β)
(36)
where x−it ∈ Rm×(n−1)+ is the actions of the other (n − 1)
agents, r represents the interdependence of the total targets,
and s represents each agents preference to avoid detection.
The static inaccuracy (i.e. noise-to-signal ratio) of each quarry
authentication is contained in the elements of β ∈ Rm+ . The
malicious social budget of each agent i is given by Iit . The total
resources available to the authentication agent are limited such
that in any operating period t the total resources available for
queries for authentication is given by
∑m
j=1 pt(j). Consider
the case with m = 2 fictitious agents. As the authentication
agent commits larger resources to increase the queries for
authentication pt(1), the associated number of friends and
followers captured by the malicious agent xt(1) decreases.
Given that the total resources available to the authentication
agent is limited, as pt(1) increases pt(2) must decrease. This
causes an increase in the friends and followers captured by
the malicious agent for the m = 2 fictitious agent xt(2).
Therefore the malicious social budget is considered to satisfy
the linear relation Iit = p
′
tx
i
t. Malicious agents are those that
are engaged in a concave potential game which attempt to
maximize their respective utility function (36), and normal
agents which have no target preference and therefore select xit
in a uniform random fashion. At each observation t, a noisy
measurement yit (defined in (28)) is made of the actions x
i
t.
Given the dataset Dobs (28), a statistical test can be used to
detect if malicious agents are present.
The dataset D (22) for malicious agents are generated by
computing the maximum, {xit}i∈{1,2,...,n}, of the concave po-
tential function V =
∑n
i=1 u
i(xi, x−i), with ui(·) defined by
(36), for a given probe pt (refer to (27)). The parameter values
for the numerical example are n = 3,m = 2, β = [0.03, 0.08],
and γ = 0.05, where n,m, β are defined in Sec. VI-B. The
malicious social budget for each of the n = 3 agents is
generated from the normal distributions: I1t ∼ N (20, 1), I2t ∼
N (50, 1), and I2t ∼ N (80, 4). The queries for authentication
are generated from the uniform distribution pt ∼ U(1, 5).
For normal agents, D (22) is constructed from xit obtained
from the uniform random variable xit ∼ U(1, 50). The datasets
Dobs (28) are obtained using the clean dataset D, and additive
noise wi ∼ U(0, κ) where κ represents the magnitude of the
measurement error.
Fig. 8 plots the estimated cost (34) versus iterates generated
by the SPSA algorithm (35) for σ = 0.1,  = 0.2, κ =
0.1, and T = 20 observations. Fig. 8 illustrates that by
judiciously adapting the external influence via a stochastic
gradient algorithm, the probability of Type-II errors can be
decreased to approximately 30% allowing the statistical test
(30) to adequately reject normal agents.
Fig. 9 plots the probability that a dataset Dobs (28) that
satisfies the decision test (25) and statistical test (30) for agents
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Fig. 8. Performance of the SPSA algorithm (35) for computing the locally
optimal external influence p to reduce the probability of Type-II errors of the
statistical test (30). The parameters are defined in Sec. VI-B.
engaged in a concave potential game. The locally optimized
external influence p was obtained from the results of the
SPSA algorithm above, allowing the malicious and normal
agents to be distinguished. As seen, the occurrence of Type-I
errors in the statistical test is less then 5%, as expected from
Theorem 5.3 because γ = 5%.
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Fig. 9. Performance of the decision test (25), and statistical test (30) for the
detection of malicious agents and normal agents. The parameters are defined
in Sec. VI-B.
VII. SUMMARY
The unifying theme of this paper was to study equilibrium
play in non-cooperative games amongst agents in a social net-
work. The first part focused on the distributed reinforcement
learning aspect of an equilibrium notion, namely, correlated
equilibrium. Agents with identical homophilic characteristics
formed social groups wherein they shared past experiences
over the network topology graph. A reinforcement learning
algorithm was presented that, relying on diffusion coopera-
tion strategies in adaptive networks, facilitated the learning
dynamics. It was shown that, if all agents follow the proposed
algorithm, their global behavior of the network of agents is
attracted to the correlated equilibria set of the game. The
second part focused on parsing datasets from a social network
for detecting play from the equilibrium of a concave potential
game. A non-parametric decision test and statistical test was
constructed to detect equilibrium play which only required
the external influence and actions of agents. To reduce the
probability of Type-II errors, a stochastic gradient algorithm
was given to adapt the external influence in real time. Finally,
we illustrated the application of the decision test, statistical
test, and stochastic gradient algorithm in a real-world example
using the energy market, and provided a numerical example
to detect malicious agents in an online social network. An
important property of both aspects considered in this paper is
their ordinal nature, which provides a useful approximation to
human behavior.
APPENDIX A
SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
The convergence analysis is based on [53] and is organized
into three steps. For brevity and better readability, details
for each step of the proof are omitted, however, adequate
references are provided for the interested reader.
Step 1: The first step uses weak convergence methods to
characterize the limit individual behavior of agents following
Algorithm 1 as a dynamical system represented by a differ-
ential inclusion. Differential inclusions are generalizations of
the ODEs [54]. Below, we provide a precise definition.
Definition A.1: A differential inclusion is a dynamical sys-
tem of the form
d
dt
X ∈ F (X) (37)
where X ∈ Rr and F : Rr → Rr is a Marchaud map [54].
That is, i) the graph and domain of F are nonempty and
closed; ii) the values F (X) are convex; and iii) the growth of
F is linear: There exists C > 0 such that, for every X ∈ Rr,
sup
Y ∈F(X)
‖Y ‖ ≤ C (1 + ‖X‖) (38)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes any norm on Rr.
We proceed to study the properties of the sequence {akn}
made according to Algorithm 1, which forms finite-state
Markov chain—see Sec. III-D. Standard results on Markov
chains show that the transition matrix (9) admits (at least) one
invariant measure, denoted by σk. Then, the following lemma
characterizes the properties of such an invariant measure.
Lemma A.1: The invariant measure σk(Rk) of the transi-
tion probabilities (9) takes the form
σ(Rk) = (1− δ)ψk(Rk)+ (δ/A) · 1A, (39)
where ψk(Rk) satisfies∑
j 6=i ψ
k
j
∣∣rk(j, i)∣∣+ = ψki ∑j 6=i ∣∣rk(i, j)∣∣+, (40)
and |x|+ = max{x, 0}.
In light of the diffusion protocol (6), agents’ successive
decisions affect, not only their own future decision strate-
gies, but also their neighbors’ policies. This suggests look-
ing at the dynamics of the regret for the entire network:
Rn := col
(
R1n, . . . , R
K
n
)
. Using techniques from the theory
of stochastic approximations [41], we work with the piecewise
constant continuous-time interpolations of Rn, defined by
Rε(t) = Rn for t ∈ [kε, (k + 1)ε), (41)
to derive the limiting process associated with Rn. Let ∆A−k
represent the simplex of all probability distributions over the
joint action profiles of all agents excluding agent k, and ⊗
denote the Kronecker product.
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Theorem A.1: Consider the interpolated process Rε(·) de-
fined in (41). Then, as ε → 0, Rε(·) converges weakly8
to R(·) that is a solution of the system of interconnected
differential inclusions
dR
dt
∈ H (R) + (C− I)R, (42)
where C = C ⊗ IA (see (7)), A denotes the cardinality of the
agents’ action set, and
hij (R) =
{[
uκ(ι,p−κ)− uκ(j,p−κ)]ψκι ;p−κ ∈ ∆A−κ} ,
ι = i mod A, κ =
⌊
i
A
⌋
+ 1.
Further, ψk represents the stationary distribution characterized
in Lemma A.1.
Proof: The proof relies on stochastic averaging theory
and is omitted for brevity. The interested reader is referred
to [14, Appendix B] for a detailed proof.
Step 2: Next, we examine stability of the limit sys-
tem (42), and show its set of global attractors comprises an
-neighborhood of the negative orthant. With slight abuse of
notation, we rearrange the elements of the global regret matrix
R as a vector, but still denote it by R.
Theorem A.2: Consider the limit dynamical system (42).
Let
R− =
{
x ∈ RK(A)2 ; |x|+ ≤ 1
}
. (43)
Let further Rk(0) = Rk0 . Then, for each  ≥ 0, there exists
δ̂ () ≥ 0 such that if δ ≤ δ̂ () in (39) (or equivalently in the
decision strategy (9)), the set R− is globally asymptotically
stable for the limit system (42). That is,
lim
t→∞dist
[
R(t),R−
]
= 0, (44)
where dist [·, ·] denotes the usual distance function.
Proof: The proof uses Lyapunov stability theory and is
omitted for brevity.
Subsequently, we study asymptotic stability by looking at
the case where ε → 0, n → ∞, and εn → ∞. Nevertheless,
instead of considering a two-stage limit by first letting ε→ 0
and then t → ∞, we study Rε(t + tε) and require tε → ∞
as ε → 0. The following corollary asserts that the results of
Theorem A.2 also hold for the interpolated processes.
Corollary A.1: Denote by {tε} any sequence of real num-
bers satisfying tµ → ∞ as µ → 0. Suppose {Rn : ε >
0, n < ∞} is tight or bounded in probability. Then, for each
 ≥ 0, there exists δ̂ () ≥ 0 such that if 0 < δ ≤ δ̂() in (9),
Rε(·+ tε)→ R− in probability, where R− is defined in (43).
The above corollary completes the proof of the first result
in Theorem 4.1.
Step 3: In the final step, we show that the convergence
of the regrets of individual agents to an -neighborhood of
the negative orthant provides the necessary and sufficient
condition for convergence of their global behavior to the
correlated -equilibria set. This is summarized in the following
theorem.
8Let Zn and Z be Rr-valued random vectors. Zn converges weakly to
Z, denoted by Zn ⇒ Z, if for any bounded and continuous function ψ(·),
Eψ(Zn)→ Eψ(Z) as n→∞.
Theorem A.3: Recall the interpolated processes for the
global regret matrix Rε(·), defined in (41), and agent’s col-
lective behavior zε(·), defined in (15). Then, zε(·) converges
in probability to the correlated -equilibrium if and only if
Rε(·)→ R− in probability, where R− is defined in (43).
Proof: The proof relies on how the regrets are defined.
The interested reader is referred to [17, Section IV-D] for a
somewhat similar proof.
The above theorem, together with Corollary A.1, completes
the proof for the second result in Theorem 4.1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3
Consider a dataset D (22) that satisfies Nash rationality (25).
Given D, the inequalities (25) have a feasible solution. Denote
the solution parameters of (25), given D, by {λiot > 0, V ot }.
Substituting xit = y
i
t − wit, from (28), into the inequalities
obtained from the solution of (25) given D, we obtain the
inequalities:
V oτ − V ot −
n∑
i=1
λiot p
′
t(y
i
τ − yit) ≤
n∑
i=1
λiot p
′
t(w
i
t − wiτ ). (45)
The goal is to compute an upper bound on the r.h.s. of (45) that
is independent of λiot . Notice that the following inequalities
provide an upper bound on the r.h.s. of (45):
n∑
i=1
λiot p
′
t(w
i
t − wiτ ) ≤
n∑
i=1
λiot |p′t(wit − wiτ )|
≤
( n∑
i=1
λiot
)( n∑
i=1
|p′t(wit − wiτ )|
)
≤ ΛtM (46)
with Λt =
∑n
i=1 λ
io
t , and M defined by (32). Substituting
(46) into (45) the following inequalities are obtained:
1
Λt
(
V oτ − V ot −
n∑
i=1
λiot p
′
t(y
i
τ − yit)
)
≤M. (47)
A solution of (31) given Dobs, defined by (28), is denoted
by {Φ∗{y}, λi∗t , V ∗t }. By comparing the inequalities obtained
from the solution of (31) given Dobs, and the inequalities
(47), notice that {Φ∗{y} = M,λi∗t = λiot , V ∗t = V ot } is a
feasible, but not necessarily optimal solution of (31) given
Dobs. Therefore, for D satisfying malicious cooperation, it
must be the case that Φ∗{y} ≤ M . This asserts, under the
null hypothesis H0, that Φ∗{y} is upper bounded by M .
For a given Φ∗{y}, the integral in (30) is the probability of
Φ∗{y} ≤M ; therefore, the conditional probability of rejecting
H0 when true is less then γ. 
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